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WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 2

MICHIGAN
Bolt v. City of Lansing, 561 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1997) (holding that
city's charge to landowners for cost of separating storm water from
sewage system and treating storm water runoff was a "user fee" and not
a tax requiring voter approval under local law).
In an effort to comply with requirements of the Clean Water Act,
the Lansing City Council adopted an ordinance that provided for the
creation of a storm water enterprise fund. The project separated the
storm water and sewage water, and provided for treatment of the
storm water to remove pollutants before discharging the water into
navigable waterways. The city financed the system's cost through an
annual storm water service charge. The city imposed this charge on
each parcel of real property in accordance with a formula that calculated each parcel's estimated storm water runoff. The ordinance also
provided a system of administrative appeals by property owners who
disputed the assessment of their parcel. Under this process, the property owner could reduce the storm water fee by showing that his parcel
produced little or no storm water runoff, or that its actual runoff was
less than the city's estimate. The city began billing property owners in
December of 1995.
The Plaintiff ("Bolt") challenged the ordinance on grounds that it
violated the Headlee Amendment to the Michigan State Constitution,
which required voter approval of any increase in local taxes. The sole
issue was whether the court considered the charge to landowners for
the cost of separating the storm water a "tax" which required voter approval, or whether it was considered a "user fee" which did not require
voter approval.
The court found that the Headlee Amendment to the State's constitution failed to define a tax or a fee. However, in examining old
cases and comparing this service to other city services, the court concluded that the storm water charge was a "user fee" and not a tax.
Thus, the ordinance did not violate the Headlee Amendment.
The court reasoned by analogy that if, as found in earlier cases,
sewage disposal charges to landowners constituted "user fees," then the
storm water charges were also "user fees." In addition, the charges did
not lose their character as fees simply because the ordinance separated
them from the original sewer disposal charge.
The dissenting opinion found that the policy of the Headlee
Amendment is to prevent the legislature from increasing its spending
and taxing without the approval of the voters, and this ordinance did
just that. The dissent also contended that the majority misclassified
the storm water charge as a fee although it had more characteristics of
a tax within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment.
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